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IN 7HF SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE Or UTAH 
BRAY LINES INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH CARRIERS, INC., a Utah, 
corporation, and G. EUGENE 
ENGLAND, an individual, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20756 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, G. Eugene England, appeals from a decision of 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, in which 
the Court granted the Respondent's Motion For Summary Judgment 
against the Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether Summary Judgment was appropriate in a case wherein 
an individual Defendant had signed a guarantee for payment of a 
corporate obligation, when defenses of failure of consideration 
and unjust enrichment were raised, both in the pleadings and by 
affidavit and no contrary evidence was presented at the hearing 
for Summary Judgment and no discovery had yet been undertaken by 
the parties. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower Court heard argument on Respondent's Motion For 
Summary Judgment on April 15, 1985. The Court ruled that in 
assuming the facts in a light most favorable to the Defendants, 
it was the Courts opinion and under the law applicable to the 
case, the Defendant (singular) haD no recognizable defense and 
granted the Motion For Summary Judgment on May 16, 1985. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower Court ruling, 
vacating the Summary Judgment against the individual Defendant 
and allowing the matter, with respect to him, to proceed to trial 
on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In April of 1978, the Respondent, Bray Lines Incorporated, 
hereinafter referred to as Bray Lines, was a corporation engaged 
in the interstate trucking business and also ICC authority to 
haul various types of loads in various areas of the country. In 
April of 1978, Bray Lines was approached by Duane Barker, who was 
at that time, President of a trucking company known as 
International Contract Carriers. In that capacity, Barker 
entered into negotiations with Bray Lines for the purchase of its 
authority. Barker was advised by counsel for Bray Lines, that 
Bray Lines could not sell the authority directly to an existing 
company, but had to sell to a new entity, in which Barker 
ostensibly had no interest. (See Record on Appeal, Affidavit of 
Duane Barker) 
Pursuant to these discussions, Barker established a new 
entity, known as Utah Carriers, Inc., a Utah corporation and one 
of the Defendants in the case below. Although Barker would be 
operating the company and in effect, would have the controlling 
interest therein, for the purposes of consummating the sale, he 
could not be shown as an Officer, Director or Shareholder. 
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Therefore, the other co-Defendant in the case below, G. Eugene 
England, the father-in-law of Duane Barker was approached by all 
of the parties to be utilized for the purpose of signing the 
documents as an officer of Utah Carriers. 
All of the parties to the transaction knew that England was 
in fact, a disinterested party, whose only involvement was as a -
"straw man" to form Utah Carriers to meet the requirements of the 
ICC for the sale of authority. (See Record on Appeal, Complaint) 
The negotiations came to fruition, and on April 12, 1978, 
Bray Lines sold its authority to Utah Carriers (See Record on 
Appeal, Complaint) for the sum of $309,438,39. The Respondent 
required that England sign a guarantee for said Agreement, which 
was evidenced by a Promissory Note. Affixed to the guarantee, in 
the handwriting of one of the Officers of the Plaintiff, are the 
words, "Duane Barker is the owner, Eugene England's son-in-law". 
(See Record on Appeal, Guarantee attached to Plaintiff's 
Complaint) Following the consummation of the arrangement, G. 
Eugene England never exercised any authority in Utah Carriers, 
was never compensated in any way from Utah Carriers and was not 
compensated in any way for signing as a guarantor the Note which 
secured the payment obligation, by either Utah Carriers or by 
Bray Lines. He was never given stock in the company and received 
no dividends or any other remunerations (See Record on Appeal, 
Affidavit of Duane Barker). 
In 1980, the trucking industry in the United States was 
deregulated, which had the effect of making interstate carrier 
authority much more available to anyone who made an application 
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for it. In this particular case, it had the effect of rendering 
authority, which at one time had been worth over $300,000.00 
virtually useless. Deregulation also had an adverse impact on 
Defendant Utah Carriers, in that many other small carriers 
entered the competitive market and Utah Carriers fell on hard 
financial times. As a net result of these problems, Utah 
Carriers became financially impotent and unable to pay the total 
obligation to Bray Lines, although they had paid in excess of 
$250,000.00 on said obligation. 
In May of 1984, Bray Lines brought suit against both Utah 
Carriers as a corporation and G. Eugene England for the balance 
of the Note in the sum of $44,556.39. The Defendants filed an 
answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, alleging inter alia failure of 
consideration with respect to the Defendant England, and, also 
the unconscionability and unforceability of the Agreement due to 
the deregulation and the equitable defense of unjust enrichment 
on behalf of both parties if the amount were to be enforced. {See 
Record on Appeal, Answer of Defendants) No other discovery, in 
the form of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions or 
Depositions was taken in the ensuing months and in March of 1985, 
Bray Lines filed for Summary Judgment. 
Both parties submitted Memorandums to the Court, with 
respect to the adviseability of granting Summary Judgment. The 
Respondent submitted no Affidavit in support of its position, but 
relied soley on its Complaint and the answer on file. The 
Appellant's submitted not only a Memorandum, but an Affidavit of 
Duane Barker in support of its position that Summary Judgment was 
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not appropriate. 
A hearing was held on April 15, 1985, in which both parties 
argued their positions from the Memorandum, but no additional 
evidence was taken by the Court, other than that found in the 
file. (See Record on Appeal, Minute Entry of Proceedings, April 
15, 1985) Based upon the evidence submitted, the Court granted 
Summary Judgment as against both Defendants, finding that both 
Defendants had no recognizable defense to the action. It is from 
that decision that the individual Defendant, G. Eugene England 
appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial Court erred in granting Plaintiff's Motion For 
Summary Judgment, in that there were geniune issues of fact and 
law with respect to the individual Defendants claim of lack of 
consideration and that Plaintiff's presented no evidence, other 
than the allegation contained in its Complaint to the contrary 
and therefore, the Court was arbitrary in granting Summary 
Judgment without further discovery and without allowing the case 
to proceed on its merits. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court has long taken the position that any summary 
proceeding which is dispositive of a lawsuit, should be viewed 
with great caution, so that a party whose cause night have merit, 
is not deprived of the right to access to the Court for the 
enforcement of rights to redress wrong. (McBride v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 432 (Utah 1980) 
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Rule 56c of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that 
Summary Judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
Depositions, Answers to Interrogatories and Admissions on file, 
together with Affidavits, if any, show that there are no geniune 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law. 
What is clear in this case, is that there is a dirt of any 
evidence in the file to allow a Judge to reach the conclusion 
that there was no geniune issue as to any material facts, with 
respect to the individual Defendant. The only thing the file 
contained in this case, at the time the lower Court rendered its 
Summary Judgment decision, was an unverified Complaint, an 
Answer, two Memorandums presented by each party and an Affidavit 
presented by the Defendants. There were no Depositions, Answers 
to Interrogatories or Admissions on file to assist the Court in 
its determination. Nor was any oral testimony taken at the time 
of the Summary Judgment hearing. 
This Court has recently said, in the case of Gad v, Olsen, 
685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984), that a Motion For Summary Judgment can 
only be granted when there are no geniune issue as to any 
material fact and even assuming the facts as asserted by the 
party moved against to be true, that the party could not prevail. 
In this case, Plaintiff's brouaht suit against both a corporate 
and an individual Defendant on essentially a Promissory Note, 
alleging a default of the payments thereon. 
In all cases involving the enforcement of Promissory Notes 
and other negotiable instruments, the equitable defenses of 
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unjust enrichment, unconscionability and more particularly in 
this case, the failure of consideration are valid defenses, which 
if factually supported, can prevent the enforcement of the 
obligation. (See 12 Am Jur 2d Bills & Notes §215-254) In this 
case, the only evidence the Court had before it, at the time of 
Summary Judgment with respect to the individual Defendant was, 
that there was indeed a failure of consideration with respect to 
him. There was no indication that he had received any 
remuneration from either the Plaintiff or the corporate entity 
for his participation. The evidence was that he was merely 
acting as a stand in for his son-in-law to effect a transfer of 
authority. The evidence at the time of the Summary Judgment was 
that all of the parties knew that his involvement was merely as a 
"straw man" and that they were really dealing with a corporate 
entity, Utah Carriers, and an individual named Duane Barker. 
Defendant asserts that even it there had been contrary 
evidence presented by the Plaintiff's at the time of the Summary 
Judgment hearing, either through Interrogatories, Admissions or 
Affidavits, that this would certainly be a litigable issue and a 
factual dispute which would have to be resolved at a hearing on 
the merits and certainly would fall far short of achieving the 
requirement of Summary Judgment that there were no material 
issues of fact to be resolved. 
The Judge's error is even more compelling in this case 
however, because there was no evidence presented at all by the 
Plaintiff's either through documents or testimony to counter the 
individual Defendant's defense or the Affidavit. In that 
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instance, very clearly, the Defendant had the right to pursue his 
defense in a trial on the merits and net be treated in a summary 
manner, as he was in this case. What Defendant believes happened 
in this case, is supported by the initial inconsistent ruling by 
the Court on April 15, 1985. The Defendant believes that the 
Court looked at the primary defense raised on behalf of the 
corporate Defendant, that deregulation rendered the ICC authority 
virtually useless therefore, the underlying Note could not be 
enforced, and found that that defense, as a matter of law, could 
not be recognized and in fact, so stated in its initial Minute 
Entry of April 15, 1985, referring to the Defendant (singular) as 
having no recognizable defense. The Court did not address the 
defenses raised by the individual Defendant and therefore, 
counsel sought a clarification. (See counsel's letter, attached 
as Exhibit 3) 
On May 16, 1985, in a second Minute Entry, the Court 
clarified its intent and that was that the Judgment be entered 
against both the Defendants, but did not clarify that it found 
that, the defenses raised by the individual Defendant were not 
recognizable under the law. Defendant agrees that the Court 
failed to make this comment because in fact, the Court could not 
make such a finding given the present status of the ]aw of equity 
and under the facts as the Court had them in the file at the time 
of the Summary Judgment hearing. 
This Court has an obligation to allow litigants to proceed 
on an orderly basis with a resolution of their disputes on the 
merits, unless there are simply no facts in dispute and the law 
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is clear. In this case, that is not the situation. The facts 
are in dispute and the law allows the defenses raised, if 
factually supported, and the individual Defendant should have the 
opportunity to present his case in the context of a trial on the 
merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case is not one in which Summary Judgment is 
appropriate. The Court erred in finding such against the 
individual Defendant, as there were geniune issues of fact, which 
were in dispute based upon the status of the pleadings at the 
time and the Court is not allowed to infer other facts which are 
not present in a Summary Judgment proceeding. Because the Court 
over-reached in granting Summary Judgment, the Defendant 
respectfully submits, with respect to the individual Defendant, 
G. Eugene England, that the decision of the lower Court be 
reversed and that the case be allowed to proceed on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2MJ-^ff?^f August, 1985. 
JOHNTL CAINE 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Honorable James S. Sawaya 
District Court Judge 
240 East 400 Sout-h 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Bray Lines v. Utah Carriers 
and G. Eugene Enqland 
Civil No. C84-2634 
Dear Judge Sawaya: 
I received your minute entry ruling concerning the plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment which was heard on April 15, 1985. I 
am somewhat confused as to whether or not your ruling goes only 
to Utah Carriers or to the defendant England. By it's terms, you 
have indicated that the defendant, singular, has no recognizable 
defense. As ycu recall, however, there are two defendants, the 
corporate defendant, Utah Carriers, and England. If, in fact, 
you arc granting summary judgment only to Utah Carriers then I 
have no difficulty with the decision. If, however, you 5re 
extending the summary judgment to England, perhaps a motion to 
reconsider or tc clarify would be in order. 
I would remind the court that the only evidence before the court 
at the time of the motion concerning Mr. England's involvement 
was that he had guaranteed the note. The plaintiff never alleged 
in it's complaint or by any affidavit that his guarantee was 
necessary for the extension of credit to the company and the 
affidavit submitted by Duane Barker indicates that. England was 
never really a functioning officer of the corporation nor did he 
receive any financial benefits for what he did. 
It would seem tc me that under these circumstances, the case with 
respect to England should be tried on the merits, but if the 
court intended the summary judgment to go to both I need tc know 
that. 
EXHIBIT 3 
I would appreciate the court advising me a*- to it's desires xn 
this natter. 
JTC/stn 
ccz Michael Mohrman 
